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and apparent ownership of the goods and the lack of registration of any
lien thereon. HARRY L. BROWN.
DEFAMATION
LIBEL BY PUBLICATION OF PICTURE
A petition alleged that the defendant published an article concerning
a convict in the state penitentiary connected with the Lindbergh kid-
napping and that in the article was the plaintiff's picture with the con-
vict's name thereunder. The lower court sustained a demurrer to the
petition. Held, such a petition states a good cause of action for libel.
Petransky v. Repository Pub. Co., 51 Ohio App. 306, 2o0 N.E. 647
(1935).
A libel is a publication, expressed in printing or writing or by signs
and pictures, tending to injure the reputation of a person and to expose
him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. Burns v. Telegram Pub.
Co., 89 Conn. 549, 94 Ad. 917 (1915); Willetts v. Scudder, 72
Ore. 535, 144 Pac. 87 (1914). It is well settled that a libel can be
made by a picture, portrait, or caricature. McGeary v. Leader Pub. Co.,
52 Pa. Super Ct. 35 (I912); Ellis v. Kimball, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 132,
(1834); Snively v. Record Pub. Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. I
(1921). Motion pictures may constitute the basis of an action for libel.
Brown v. Paramount Publix Corp., 27o N.Y.S. 540, 34o App. Div.
520 (1934)-
In the principal case the defendant contended that since a person
reading the whole article would see that it meant someone other than
the plaintiff, it was not libelous. In support of this contention he relied
on Woolf v. Scripps Pub. Co., 35 Ohio App. 343 (1930), in which
case the defendant published the plaintiff's picture in an article about a
third person involved in an alienation of affections suit, with the name
of the third person under the picture. The court held that the control-
ling question is not whether the article referred to the plaintiff, but
whether it was calculated to lead persons reading it to believe that it
referred to the plaintiff. This is the only other Ohio case in point, and
is supported by Ball v. Evening American Pub. Co., 237 Ill. 592, 86
N.E. 1097 (19o9). There seems to be little other authority for this
proposition.
The court in the principal case, in overruling the Woolf case, held
that the only question is whether the mode of defamation which has
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been adopted is capable of conveying a meaning detrimental to the
plaintiff. Newell on slander and libel, 4 th ed., 267. The fact that a
person's name is not mentioned in a publication alleged to be a libel on
him does not render it less libelous if the publication would be under-
stood as referring to him. Barron v. Smith, 19 S.D. 50 (1904). Some
persons might know the plaintiff by sight and not by name, or else
believe that he gave a fictitious name. Thus the defamatory article is
easily capable of conveying a meaning detrimental to the plaintiff.
The publication is libelous if it harms the party alluded to in the
estimation of an important and respectable part of the community, and
it is no excuse that the picture is published by mistake or in good faith.
Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 29 S. Ct. 154 (1908). Inno-
cence in a mistake, however, may mitigate damages. Van Wiginton v.
Pulitzer Pub. Co., 218 Fed. 795, 134 C.C.A. 483 (915). The
defendant also argued that under modern conditions, a publisher should
not be held to such strict accountability, because of the manner in which
news must be obtained and published. The court replied to this argu-
ment with the following quotation from Lord Mansfield: "Whatever
a man publishes, he publishes at his peril."
The principal case is in accord with the majority rule. Peck v.
Tribune Co., supra; De Sando v. New York Herald, supra; Wandt
v. Hearst's Chicago Zmerican, 129 Wis. 419 (19o6); Farley v.
Chronicle Pub. Co., 113 Mo. App. 216, 87 S.W. 565 (1905); James
v. Ft. Worth Telegram, I 17 S.W. 1028 (I9o9). It is believed that
this view reaches the better result. It conforms to the generally accepted
definitions of libel, and will compensate a person for injuries to his
reputation caused by an innocent mistake where the defendant has used
the greatest of care possible under the circumstances as well as for those
injuries caused by the defendant's negligence or malice.
GEORGE COLE.
EVIDENCE
BURDEN OF PROOF IN PROBATE AND CONTEST PROCEEDINGS
Corneal J. McWilliams, one day before his death, executed a cod-
icil wherein he revoked the prior appointment of the Central Trust Co.
of Cincinnati as executor-trustee of his will. Arthur J. O'Connell was
substituted in its place. The will was admitted to probate, but the codicil
was rejected. Upon appeal the judgment of the common pleas court
was affirmed upon the ground that McWilliams was not of sound mind
